Python django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation() Examples

def decode(self, session_data):
        encoded_data = base64.b64decode(force_bytes(session_data))
        try:
            # could produce ValueError if there is no ':'
            hash, serialized = encoded_data.split(b':', 1)
            expected_hash = self._hash(serialized)
            if not constant_time_compare(hash.decode(), expected_hash):
                raise SuspiciousSession("Session data corrupted")
            else:
                return self.serializer().loads(serialized)
        except Exception as e:
            # ValueError, SuspiciousOperation, unpickling exceptions. If any of
            # these happen, just return an empty dictionary (an empty session).
            if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' %
                        e.__class__.__name__)
                logger.warning(force_text(e))
            return {} 

def decode(self, session_data):
        encoded_data = base64.b64decode(force_bytes(session_data))
        try:
            # could produce ValueError if there is no ':'
            hash, serialized = encoded_data.split(b':', 1)
            expected_hash = self._hash(serialized)
            if not constant_time_compare(hash.decode(), expected_hash):
                raise SuspiciousSession("Session data corrupted")
            else:
                return self.serializer().loads(serialized)
        except Exception as e:
            # ValueError, SuspiciousOperation, unpickling exceptions. If any of
            # these happen, just return an empty dictionary (an empty session).
            if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' % e.__class__.__name__)
                logger.warning(force_text(e))
            return {} 

def decide_invitation(request, invite_id):
    invite = get_object_or_404(TeamRequest, pk=invite_id)
    team = invite.team

    if team.owner_id is None or team.owner_id != request.user.id:
        raise SuspiciousOperation(_('User is not the owner of the team'))
    elif 'accept' in request.POST:
        invite.team.members.add(invite.invitee)
        invite.team.save()
        notify.send(request.user, recipient=invite.invitee, actor=request.user, verb='accept', action_object=team, target=invite.invitee)
        messages.success(request, _('Added {name} to the team').format(name=invite.invitee.username))
    elif 'reject' in request.POST:
        notify.send(request.user, recipient=invite.invitee, actor=request.user, verb='reject', action_object=team, target=invite.invitee)
        messages.success(request, _('Ignored {name}\'s team membership request').format(name=invite.invitee.username))
    else:
        return HttpResponseBadRequest(_('POST request must include either "{accept}" or "{reject}"').format(accept='accept', reject='reject'))

    invite.delete()
    return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('openach:view_team', args=(team.id,))) 

def invite_members(request, team_id):
    """Return a team edit view, or handle the form submission."""
    team = get_object_or_404(Team, pk=team_id)

    if team.owner_id is None or team.owner_id != request.user.id:
        raise SuspiciousOperation(_('User is not the owner of the team'))

    if request.method == 'POST':
        form = TeamInviteForm(request.POST, team=team)
        if form.is_valid():
            to_invite = form.cleaned_data['members']
            invites = [TeamRequest(team=team, inviter=request.user, invitee=x) for x in to_invite]
            TeamRequest.objects.bulk_create(invites)
            for user in to_invite:
                notify.send(request.user, recipient=user, actor=request.user, verb='invite', action_object=team, target=user)
            messages.success(request, _('Invited {count} members to the team').format(count=len(to_invite)))
            return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('openach:view_team', args=(team.id,)))
    else:
        form = TeamInviteForm(team=team)
    return render(request, 'teams/invite.html', context={
        'team': team,
        'form': form
    }) 

def edit_team(request, team_id):
    """Return a team edit view, or handle the form submission."""
    # TODO: if user turns off invitation-required, let everyone in who had outstanding membership requests

    team = get_object_or_404(Team, pk=team_id)

    if team.owner_id is None or team.owner_id != request.user.id:
        raise SuspiciousOperation(_('User is not the owner of the team'))

    if request.method == 'POST':
        form = TeamCreateForm(request.POST, instance=team)
        if form.is_valid():
            form.save()
            messages.success(request, _('Updated team information'))
            return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('openach:view_team', args=(team.id,)))
    else:
        form = TeamCreateForm(instance=team)
    return render(request, 'teams/edit_team.html', context={
        'team': team,
        'form': form
    }) 

def revoke_membership(request, team_id, member_id):
    team = get_object_or_404(Team, pk=team_id)
    user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=member_id)

    if team.owner_id is None or team.owner_id != request.user.id:
        raise SuspiciousOperation(_('User is not the owner of the team'))
    elif user == team.owner:
        raise SuspiciousOperation(_('Cannot remove the owner from the team'))
    elif not team.invitation_required:
        raise SuspiciousOperation(_('Cannot remove user from teams that don\'t require an invitation'))

    team.members.remove(user)
    team.save()
    notify.send(request.user, recipient=user, actor=request.user, verb='remove', action_object=team, target=user)
    messages.success(request, _('Removed {name} from team').format(name=user.username))
    return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('openach:view_team', args=(team.id,))) 

def join_team(request, team_id):
    team = get_object_or_404(Team, pk=team_id)

    if team.members.filter(id=request.user.id).exists():
        raise SuspiciousOperation(_('User is already a member of the team'))
    elif TeamRequest.objects.filter(invitee=request.user, inviter__isnull=False, team=team).exists() or not team.invitation_required:
        team.members.add(request.user)
        team.save()
        TeamRequest.objects.filter(invitee=request.user, team=team).delete()
        messages.success(request, _('Joined team {name}').format(name=team.name))
        return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('openach:view_team', args=(team.id,)))
    elif TeamRequest.objects.filter(invitee=request.user, team=team).exists():
        return HttpResponseBadRequest(_('User already has a membership request with the team'))
    else:
        TeamRequest.objects.create(invitee=request.user, team=team)
        if team.owner:
            notify.send(request.user, recipient=team.owner, actor=request.user, verb='request_membership', target=team)
        messages.success(request, _('Requested invitation to team {name}').format(name=team.name))
        return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('openach:view_team', args=(team.id,))) 

def _normalize_name(self, name):
        """
        Normalizes the name so that paths like /path/to/ignored/../foo.txt
        work. We check to make sure that the path pointed to is not outside
        the directory specified by the LOCATION setting.
        """
        if name.startswith("https://") or name.startswith("http://"):
            return name
        base_path = force_text(self.location)
        base_path = base_path.rstrip('/')

        final_path = urljoin(base_path.rstrip('/') + "/", name)

        base_path_len = len(base_path)
        if (not final_path.startswith(base_path) or
                final_path[base_path_len:base_path_len + 1] not in ('', '/')):
            raise SuspiciousOperation("Attempted access to '%s' denied." %
                                      name)
        return final_path.lstrip('/') 

def skip_suspicious_operations(record):
    """Prevent django from sending 500 error
    email notifications for SuspiciousOperation
    events, since they are not true server errors,
    especially when related to the ALLOWED_HOSTS
    configuration

    background and more information:
    http://www.tiwoc.de/blog/2013/03/django-prevent-email-notification-on-susp\
    iciousoperation/
    """
    if record.exc_info:
        exc_value = record.exc_info[1]
        if isinstance(exc_value, SuspiciousOperation):
            return False
    return True

# A sample logging configuration. The only tangible logging
# performed by this configuration is to send an email to
# the site admins on every HTTP 500 error.
# See http://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/topics/logging for
# more details on how to customize your logging configuration. 

def get_userinfo_or_introspection(self, access_token):
        try:
            claims = self.cached_request(
                self.get_userinfo, access_token, "auth.userinfo"
            )
        except requests.HTTPError as e:
            if not (
                e.response.status_code in [401, 403] and settings.OIDC_CHECK_INTROSPECT
            ):
                raise e

            # check introspection if userinfo fails (confidental client)
            claims = self.cached_request(
                self.get_introspection, access_token, "auth.introspection"
            )
            if "client_id" not in claims:
                raise SuspiciousOperation("client_id not present in introspection")

        return claims 

def decode(self, session_data):
        encoded_data = base64.b64decode(force_bytes(session_data))
        try:
            # could produce ValueError if there is no ':'
            hash, serialized = encoded_data.split(b':', 1)
            expected_hash = self._hash(serialized)
            if not constant_time_compare(hash.decode(), expected_hash):
                raise SuspiciousSession("Session data corrupted")
            else:
                return self.serializer().loads(serialized)
        except Exception as e:
            # ValueError, SuspiciousOperation, unpickling exceptions. If any of
            # these happen, just return an empty dictionary (an empty session).
            if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' % e.__class__.__name__)
                logger.warning(str(e))
            return {} 

def load(self):
        session_data = {}
        try:
            with open(self._key_to_file(), "rb") as session_file:
                file_data = session_file.read()
            # Don't fail if there is no data in the session file.
            # We may have opened the empty placeholder file.
            if file_data:
                try:
                    session_data = self.decode(file_data)
                except (EOFError, SuspiciousOperation) as e:
                    if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                        logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' % e.__class__.__name__)
                        logger.warning(str(e))
                    self.create()

                # Remove expired sessions.
                expiry_age = self.get_expiry_age(expiry=self._expiry_date(session_data))
                if expiry_age <= 0:
                    session_data = {}
                    self.delete()
                    self.create()
        except (IOError, SuspiciousOperation):
            self._session_key = None
        return session_data 

def load(self):
        try:
            data = self._cache.get(self.cache_key)
        except Exception:
            # Some backends (e.g. memcache) raise an exception on invalid
            # cache keys. If this happens, reset the session. See #17810.
            data = None

        if data is None:
            # Duplicate DBStore.load, because we need to keep track
            # of the expiry date to set it properly in the cache.
            try:
                s = self.model.objects.get(
                    session_key=self.session_key,
                    expire_date__gt=timezone.now()
                )
                data = self.decode(s.session_data)
                self._cache.set(self.cache_key, data, self.get_expiry_age(expiry=s.expire_date))
            except (self.model.DoesNotExist, SuspiciousOperation) as e:
                if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                    logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' % e.__class__.__name__)
                    logger.warning(str(e))
                self._session_key = None
                data = {}
        return data 

def test_allowed_unsecured_invalid_token(self):
        """Test payload data from invalid secure token (unsecured allowed)."""
        header = force_bytes(json.dumps({'alg': 'HS256', 'typ': 'JWT'}))
        payload = force_bytes(json.dumps({'foo': 'bar'}))

        # Compute signature
        key = b'mysupersecuretestkey'
        fake_key = b'mysupersecurefaketestkey'
        h = hmac.HMAC(key, hashes.SHA256(), backend=default_backend())
        msg = '{}.{}'.format(smart_text(b64encode(header)), smart_text(b64encode(payload)))
        h.update(force_bytes(msg))
        signature = b64encode(h.finalize())

        token = '{}.{}.{}'.format(
            smart_text(b64encode(header)),
            smart_text(b64encode(payload)),
            smart_text(signature)
        )
        token_bytes = force_bytes(token)
        key_text = smart_text(fake_key)

        with self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation) as ctx:
            self.backend.get_payload_data(token_bytes, key_text)
        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.args[0], 'JWS token verification failed.') 

def test_get_auth_failure_tampered_session_state(self):
        """Test authentication failure attempt for an inactive user."""
        user = User.objects.create_user('example_username')
        user.is_active = False
        user.save()

        get_data = {
            'code': 'example_code',
            'state': 'example_state'
        }

        url = reverse('oidc_authentication_callback')
        request = self.factory.get(url, get_data)
        request.session = {
            'oidc_state': 'tampered_state'
        }
        callback_view = views.OIDCAuthenticationCallbackView.as_view()

        with self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation) as context:
            callback_view(request)

        expected_error_message = 'Session `oidc_state` does not match the OIDC callback state'
        self.assertEqual(context.exception.args, (expected_error_message,)) 

def decode(self, session_data):
        encoded_data = base64.b64decode(force_bytes(session_data))
        try:
            # could produce ValueError if there is no ':'
            hash, serialized = encoded_data.split(b':', 1)
            expected_hash = self._hash(serialized)
            if not constant_time_compare(hash.decode(), expected_hash):
                raise SuspiciousSession("Session data corrupted")
            else:
                return self.serializer().loads(serialized)
        except Exception as e:
            # ValueError, SuspiciousOperation, unpickling exceptions. If any of
            # these happen, just return an empty dictionary (an empty session).
            if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' %
                        e.__class__.__name__)
                logger.warning(force_text(e))
            return {} 

def _update_unget_history(self, num_bytes):
        """
        Updates the unget history as a sanity check to see if we've pushed
        back the same number of bytes in one chunk. If we keep ungetting the
        same number of bytes many times (here, 50), we're mostly likely in an
        infinite loop of some sort. This is usually caused by a
        maliciously-malformed MIME request.
        """
        self._unget_history = [num_bytes] + self._unget_history[:49]
        number_equal = len([current_number for current_number in self._unget_history
                            if current_number == num_bytes])

        if number_equal > 40:
            raise SuspiciousOperation(
                "The multipart parser got stuck, which shouldn't happen with"
                " normal uploaded files. Check for malicious upload activity;"
                " if there is none, report this to the Django developers."
            ) 

def get_host(self):
        """Returns the HTTP host using the environment or request headers."""
        # We try three options, in order of decreasing preference.
        if settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST and (
            'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST' in self.META):
            host = self.META['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST']
        elif 'HTTP_HOST' in self.META:
            host = self.META['HTTP_HOST']
        else:
            # Reconstruct the host using the algorithm from PEP 333.
            host = self.META['SERVER_NAME']
            server_port = str(self.META['SERVER_PORT'])
            if server_port != ('443' if self.is_secure() else '80'):
                host = '%s:%s' % (host, server_port)

        allowed_hosts = ['*'] if settings.DEBUG else settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
        if validate_host(host, allowed_hosts):
            return host
        else:
            raise SuspiciousOperation(
                "Invalid HTTP_HOST header (you may need to set ALLOWED_HOSTS): %s" % host) 

def load(self):
        session_data = {}
        try:
            with open(self._key_to_file(), "rb") as session_file:
                file_data = session_file.read()
            # Don't fail if there is no data in the session file.
            # We may have opened the empty placeholder file.
            if file_data:
                try:
                    session_data = self.decode(file_data)
                except (EOFError, SuspiciousOperation) as e:
                    if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                        logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' % e.__class__.__name__)
                        logger.warning(str(e))
                    self.create()

                # Remove expired sessions.
                expiry_age = self.get_expiry_age(expiry=self._expiry_date(session_data))
                if expiry_age <= 0:
                    session_data = {}
                    self.delete()
                    self.create()
        except (IOError, SuspiciousOperation):
            self._session_key = None
        return session_data 

def decode(self, session_data):
        encoded_data = base64.b64decode(force_bytes(session_data))
        try:
            # could produce ValueError if there is no ':'
            hash, serialized = encoded_data.split(b':', 1)
            expected_hash = self._hash(serialized)
            if not constant_time_compare(hash.decode(), expected_hash):
                raise SuspiciousSession("Session data corrupted")
            else:
                return self.serializer().loads(serialized)
        except Exception as e:
            # ValueError, SuspiciousOperation, unpickling exceptions. If any of
            # these happen, just return an empty dictionary (an empty session).
            if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' % e.__class__.__name__)
                logger.warning(str(e))
            return {} 

def load(self):
        try:
            s = Session.objects.get(
                session_key=self.session_key,
                expire_date__gt=timezone.now()
            )
            self.user_id = s.user_id
            # do not overwrite user_agent/ip, as those might have been updated
            if self.user_agent != s.user_agent or self.ip != s.ip:
                self.modified = True
            return self.decode(s.session_data)
        except (Session.DoesNotExist, SuspiciousOperation) as e:
            if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' %
                                           e.__class__.__name__)
                logger.warning(force_text(e))
            self.create()
            return {} 

def body_to_dict(body, schema):
    # type: (str, Dict) -> Dict
    """

    :param body: The body content
    :param schema: The expected JSONSchema
    :return: A dictionary containing the parsed body
    :raises SuspiciousOperation: If the body is not in JSON format, or does not
       conform to the specified schema.
    """
    try:
        data = json.loads(body)
        jsonschema.validate(data, schema=schema)
        return data
    except Exception as e:
        # The SuspiciousOperation exception will result in an
        # HttpResponseBadRequest response.
        raise SuspiciousOperation(e) 

def body_to_dict(body, schema):
    # type: (str, Dict) -> Dict
    """

    :param body: The body content
    :param schema: The expected JSONSchema
    :return: A dictionary containing the parsed body
    :raises SuspiciousOperation: If the body is not in JSON format, or does not
       conform to the specified schema.
    """
    try:
        data = json.loads(body)
        jsonschema.validate(data, schema=schema)
        return data
    except Exception as e:
        # The SuspiciousOperation exception will result in an
        # HttpResponseBadRequest response.
        raise SuspiciousOperation(e) 

def body_to_dict(body, schema):
    # type: (str, Dict) -> Dict
    """

    :param body: The body content
    :param schema: The expected JSONSchema
    :return: A dictionary containing the parsed body
    :raises SuspiciousOperation: If the body is not in JSON format, or does not
       conform to the specified schema.
    """
    try:
        data = json.loads(body)
        jsonschema.validate(data, schema=schema)
        return data
    except Exception as e:
        # The SuspiciousOperation exception will result in an
        # HttpResponseBadRequest response.
        raise SuspiciousOperation(e) 

def test_disallowed_unsecured_invalid_token(self):
        """Test payload data from invalid secure token (unsecured disallowed)."""
        header = force_bytes(json.dumps({'alg': 'HS256', 'typ': 'JWT'}))
        payload = force_bytes(json.dumps({'foo': 'bar'}))

        # Compute signature
        key = b'mysupersecuretestkey'
        fake_key = b'mysupersecurefaketestkey'
        h = hmac.HMAC(key, hashes.SHA256(), backend=default_backend())
        msg = '{}.{}'.format(smart_text(b64encode(header)), smart_text(b64encode(payload)))
        h.update(force_bytes(msg))
        signature = b64encode(h.finalize())

        token = '{}.{}.{}'.format(
            smart_text(b64encode(header)),
            smart_text(b64encode(payload)),
            smart_text(signature)
        )
        token_bytes = force_bytes(token)
        key_text = smart_text(fake_key)

        with self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation) as ctx:
            self.backend.get_payload_data(token_bytes, key_text)
        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.args[0], 'JWS token verification failed.') 

def _normalize_name(self, name):
        """
        Normalizes the name so that paths like /path/to/ignored/../foo.txt
        work. We check to make sure that the path pointed to is not outside
        the directory specified by the LOCATION setting.
        """

        base_path = force_text(self.location)
        base_path = base_path.rstrip('/')

        final_path = urljoin(base_path.rstrip('/') + "/", name)

        base_path_len = len(base_path)
        if (not final_path.startswith(base_path) or
                final_path[base_path_len:base_path_len + 1] not in ('', '/')):
            raise SuspiciousOperation("Attempted access to '%s' denied." %
                                      name)
        return final_path.lstrip('/') 

def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
        payload = request.body
        if not payload:
            data = payload
        else:
            content_encoding = request.META.get('HTTP_CONTENT_ENCODING', None)
            if content_encoding:
                # try to decompress the payload.
                if content_encoding == "deflate" \
                   or "santa" in self.user_agent and content_encoding == "zlib" \
                   or self.user_agent == "Zentral/mnkpf 0.1" and content_encoding == "gzip":
                    payload = zlib.decompress(payload)
                elif content_encoding == "gzip":
                    payload = GzipFile(fileobj=request).read()
                else:
                    return HttpResponse("Unsupported Media Type", status=415)
            try:
                payload = payload.decode(self.payload_encoding)
            except UnicodeDecodeError:
                err_msg_tmpl = 'Could not decode payload with encoding %s'
                logger.error(err_msg_tmpl, self.payload_encoding, extra={'request': request})
                raise SuspiciousOperation(err_msg_tmpl % self.payload_encoding)
            try:
                data = json.loads(payload)
            except ValueError:
                raise SuspiciousOperation("Payload is not valid json")
        try:
            self.check_data_secret(data)
        except APIAuthError as auth_err:
            logger.error("APIAuthError %s", auth_err, extra={'request': request})
            return HttpResponseForbidden(str(auth_err))
        response_data = self.do_post(data)
        return JsonResponse(response_data) 

def get_enroll_secret(self, data):
        try:
            return data["enroll_secret"]
        except KeyError:
            raise SuspiciousOperation("Missing enroll_secret key in osquery enroll request") 

def abort(self, reason, **event_payload):
        if reason:
            event_payload["reason"] = reason
        self.post_event("failure", **event_payload)
        raise SuspiciousOperation(reason) 

def _get_session_from_db(self):
        try:
            return self.model.objects.get(
                session_key=self.session_key,
                expire_date__gt=timezone.now()
            )
        except (self.model.DoesNotExist, SuspiciousOperation) as e:
            if isinstance(e, SuspiciousOperation):
                logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.%s' % e.__class__.__name__)
                logger.warning(str(e))
            self._session_key = None